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O n	12	November	 2006,	Protocol	V	of	 the	Convention	 on	Certain	Conventional	Weapons	entered	 into	 force;	 it	 ad-dresses	the	humanitarian	impact	of	explosive	remnants	of	
war	other	than	landmines.3	This	“Protocol	on	Explosive	Remnants	
of	War,”	as	 it	 is	 formally	known,	contains	“remedial	measures	of	a	
generic	nature	in	order	to	minimise	the	risks	and	effects	of	explosive	
remnants	of	war.”4	With	the	Protocol	having	become	binding	inter-
national	law	for	more	than	20	states,5	attention	has	turned	toward	the	
work	necessary	to	implement	it.	
Much	of	this	attention	has	focused	on	practical	operations	of	the	
Protocol.	For	 instance,	 it	has	been	 frequently	mentioned	 that	vari-
ous	lessons	from	the	operations	of	the	Ottawa	Convention	(e.g.,	an	
informal	 work	 programme,	 a	 sponsorship	 programme)	 could	 be	
applied	 to	 Protocol	 V.	 While	 valuable	 operational	 lessons	 can	 be	
applied	in	terms	of	how	the	Protocol	functions,	what	is	often	over-
looked	are	the	important	conceptual	lessons	that	can	be	applied	from	
the	 Ottawa	 Convention	 regarding	 what	 might	 be	 implemented.	
	
Lessons Learned from the Ottawa Convention
Some	 central	 concepts	 in	 the	 work	 to	 implement	 the	 Ottawa	
Convention	are:
•	 Responsibility: It	is	the	responsibility	of	each	individual	party	
to	the	Convention	to	fulfill	certain	obligations	in	areas	under	
its	control	or	jurisdiction.
•	 Measurable and time-bound obligations: Key	provisions	of	
the	Convention	call	for	actions	that	are	clearly	quantified	and	
must	be	carried	out	over	a	set	period	of	time.
•	 Cooperation and assistance: Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	
individual	States	Parties	 are	 responsible	 for	 fulfilling	certain	
measurable	 and	 time-bound	obligations,	 other	States	Parties	
are	required	to	assist	when	feasible	and	to	the	extent	possible.
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A	complication	exists,	though,	in	instances	when	obligations	are	
not	measurable	 and	 time-bound,	or	 even	universally	 applicable.	 In	
such	cases,	 it	 is	difficult	 for	cooperation	and	assistance	to	manifest	
because	 objectives	 and	 deadlines	 are	 not	 clearly	 defined.	A	 central	
and	 active	 role	 of	 the	 state	 is	 exactly	how	 the	States	Parties	 to	 the	
Ottawa	Convention	have	dealt	with	the	ambiguity	surrounding	the	
Convention’s	obligations	in	relation	to	mine	victims.
The	 imperative	 to	 assist	 mine	 victims	 is	 manifested	 in	 a	 legal	
obligation	 for	“each	State	Party	 in	a	position	 to	do	so”	 to	“provide	
assistance	 for	 the	 care	 and	 rehabilitation,	 and	 social	 and	 econom-
ic	 reintegration	 of	 mine	 victims.”6	 However,	 unlike	 the	 Ottawa	
Convention’s	 clear	 obligations	 to	destroy	or	 ensure	 the	destruction	
of	stockpiled	or	emplaced	anti-personnel	mines,	the	obligation	con-
cerning	mine-victim	assistance	is	ambiguous.	It	is	neither	defined	nor	
measurable.	Moreover,	even	if	defined,	the	implementation	of	objec-
tives	and	deadlines	would	not	be	universally	applicable.
The	Ottawa	Convention’s	States	Parties	have	first	dealt	with	the	
ambiguity	of	mine-victim	assistance	by	clearly	defining	mine victims 
and	victim assistance,	and	adopting	certain	common	understandings	
regarding	the	place	of	victim	assistance	in	broader	contexts.	
Second,	a	number	of	States	Parties	have	chosen	to	“self	identify,”	
an	act	of	indicating	that	addressing	the	matter	of	victim	assistance	
is	truly	relevant	and	necessary	for	them.	Certainly	it	is	understood	
all	States	Parties	have	a	responsibility	to	support	mine	victims,	no	
matter	 the	number	of	victims	 in	a	particular	 state.	However,	 this	
responsibility	is	particularly	pertinent	for	those	States	Parties	that	
have	 indicated	 significant	 numbers—hundreds	 or	 thousands—of	
survivors	in	areas	under	their	control	or	jurisdiction.	A	total	of	24	
States	Parties	have	self-identified,	acknowledging	that	comparative-
ly	they	have	some	of	the	greatest	needs	and	greatest	responsibilities	
to	provide	victim	assistance.	
Third,	because	these	Parties	are	ultimately	
responsible	for	their	populations,	the	matter	
of	identifying	what	can	and	should	be	done	
by	 what	 deadline	 has	 been	 turned	 over	 to	
each	 individual	 state	because	conditions	are	
unique	to	each	of	them.	In	addition,	while	ac-
knowledging	that	assisting	victims	is	a	long-
term	 task,	 a	 timeline	 has	 been	 established	
for	the	achievement	of	a	meaningful	level	of	
interim	 progress:	 the	 Ottawa	 Convention’s	
Second	Review	Conference	in	2009.
Applying these Lessons to Protocol V
Protocol	 V	 contains	 an	 obligation	 in	
Article	8.2	to	assist	victims	of	explosive	rem-
nants	 of	 war	 that	 is	 basically	 identical	 to	
the	 obligation	 in	 the	 Ottawa	 Convention.	
Hence,	the	lessons	of	the	Ottawa	Convention	
can	easily	be	applied	to	 the	effort	 to	 imple-
ment	 victim	 assistance	 under	 Protocol	 V.	
However,	even	beyond	victim	assistance,	the	
Ottawa	Convention’s	 lessons	can	be	applied	
to	Protocol	V’s	Article	3,	which	addresses	the	
clearance,	 removal	 or	 destruction	 of	 ERW.	
Additionally,	to	ensure	Protocol	V	has	a	more	
immediate	and	noticeable	 impact,	these	 les-
sons	might	also	be	applied	to	Article	7,	which	
contains	an	implicit	appeal	that	clearance,	re-
moval	or	destruction	measures	be	undertaken	
with	respect	to	already	existing	ERW.
Protocol	V’s	Article	3	calls	for	each	High	
Contracting	Party	 to	 “mark	 and	 clear,	 re-
move	or	destroy	explosive	remnants	of	war	
in	 affected	 territories	 under	 its	 control,”	
according	 priority	 to	 those	 areas	 “posing	
a	serious	humanitarian	risk.”7	Article	3	in-
cludes	specifics	regarding	how	these	provi-
sions	should	be	applied,	 including	survey-
ing	 and	 assessing	 the	 threat;	 prioritising	
needs;	marking	and	clearing,	removing	or	
destroying;	 conducting	 these	 activities	 in	
accordance	with	high	standards	(left	to	the	
reader	to	define);	and	mobilising	resources	
to	carry	out	these	activities.	
However,	 despite	 these	 specific	 provi-
sions,	success	or	failure	in	the	application	of	
Article	3	is	not	clear,	measurable,	time-bound	
or	 universally	 applicable.	 Therefore,	 the	
High	 Contracting	 Parties	 to	 Protocol	 V	
may	 benefit	 from	 applying	 the	 Ottawa	
Convention’s	methodology	for	victim	assis-
tance,	which	was	borne	out	of	similar	chal-
lenges	 in	 application.	 This	 methodology	
could	be	applicable	to	Protocol	V	Articles	3	
and	7	regarding	clearance,	removal	and	de-
struction	of	ERW,	as	well	as	to	the	victim-	
assistance	 obligation	 found	 in	 Article	 8.2,	
and	might	include	the	following	principles:
•	 States	that	wish	to	address	the	prob-
lems	 they	 face	 with	 respect	 to	 new	
and	existing	ERW	could	be	asked	to	
self-identify.
•	 As	the	responsibility	to	address	prob-
lems	caused	by	ERW	rests	with	indi-
vidual	Parties	that	have	self-identified,	
these	 Parties	 could	 be	 asked—with	
assistance	 if	 necessary—to	 provide	
baseline	 information	 on	 the	 prob-
lems	 they	 face	 and	 to	 establish	 spe-
cific,	measurable,	achievable,	relevant	
objectives	and	timelines	for	achieving	
these	objectives.
•	 States	could	be	asked	to	develop	and	
implement	plans	to	achieve	their	ob-
jectives.	As	part	of	these	plans,	there	
should	be	a	 clear	 articulation	of	pri-
orities	for	assistance.
•	 High	 Contracting	 Parties	 in	 a	 posi-
tion	 to	 provide	 assistance	 could	 re-
spond	 to	 prioritised	 assistance	 needs	
as	 articulated	 by	 Parties	 that	 have	
well-developed	plans.
•	 High	 Contracting	 Parties	 could	
periodically	 hold	 Conferences	 of	
High	 Contracting	 Parties	 to	 assess	
progress	 in	 achieving	 the	 objectives	
as	previously	articulated	by	 the	 self-	
identified	Parties.
Conclusion
This	 approach	may	 sound	 self-evident,	
but	 such	 was	 not	 the	 case	 when	 similar	
work	to	implement	the	Ottawa	Convention	
began.	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 an	 important	
nuance	 to	 this	 methodology	 that	 places	
the	 affected	 Party	 at	 the	 front	 and	 cen-
tre	of	 addressing	 its	Protocol	V	needs	and	
obligations.	 As	 such	 Parties	 hold	 ultimate	
responsibility,	notwithstanding	the	respon-
sibility	 of	 others	 to	 assist,	 these	 affected	
states	should	have	their	voices	heard	when	
it	 comes	 to	 their	 needs	 and	 aspirations.	
Equally,	 there	 should	 not	 be	 demands	 for	
large-scale	 assistance	 until	 affected	 states	
have	also	demonstrated	a	solid,	realistic	and	
measurable	plan	for	implementation.
See Endnotes, page 111
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GRAPHIC	COURTESY	OF	MAIC
While	Protocol	V’s	provisions	largely	relate	to	future	ERW,	clearance,	removal	and	destruction	of	existing	ERW	as	seen	
here	by	a	MACC	Explosive	Ordnance	Disposal	Team	member	carrying	out	a	battle-area-clearance	task,	will	be	signifi-
cant	in	ensuring	the	Protocol	lives	up	to	its	promise.	
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